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_____________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff City Select Auto Sales, Inc. received 
unsolicited fax transmissions advertising the services of 
Defendant David Randall Associates, Inc. (David Randall). 
Claiming that those faxes were sent in violation of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, 
City Select sued David Randall and its former president and 
co-owner, Raymond Miley, III. The case against Miley was 
tried to a jury and he was found not liable under the TCPA. 
After the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey entered judgment in favor of Miley and denied City 
Select’s motion for a new trial, City Select filed this timely 
appeal. 
I 
A 
 At all relevant times, David Randall was a 
Pennsylvania-based commercial roofing company. Miley was 
its president and, with his wife, owned 90 percent of the 
company. The company’s office manager, April Clemmer, 
reported to Miley and her responsibilities included “[b]asic 
secretarial duties” and “work with the service department.” 
App. 354.  
 In March, April, and May 2006, David Randall hired 
Business to Business Solutions (Business Solutions) to fax 
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unsolicited advertisements to thousands of fax numbers. The 
first transmissions were sent on March 29 after Clemmer, with 
Miley’s handwritten approval, confirmed by fax the content of 
the ad, the quantity of faxes to be sent, and the areas to be 
targeted. David Randall received complaints in response to that 
initial foray into fax advertising, and Clemmer contacted 
Business Solutions to have several fax numbers removed from 
the list. On March 31, Business Solutions sent a second wave 
of faxes, which prompted several recipients to ask that their fax 
numbers be taken off the list. Two days later came a third burst 
of transmissions and on May 15, 2006, Business Solutions sent 
a fourth and final “blast” of 12,000 faxes.   
B 
1 
 City Select (on behalf of itself and a class of similarly-
situated fax recipients) sued both David Randall and Miley in 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
City Select’s complaint alleged that the four fax campaigns had 
violated the TCPA’s prohibition against unsolicited fax 
advertising. After discovery, the parties filed summary 
judgment motions. The Court denied David Randall’s and 
Miley’s motion for summary judgment. City Select Auto Sales, 
Inc. v. David Randall Assocs., Inc., 2014 WL 4755487, at *1, 
*4–10 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2014). It also denied City Select’s 
motion for summary judgment against Miley. It granted City 
Select’s motion against David Randall, however, and entered 
judgment against the company in the amount of $22,405,000. 
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City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. David/Randall Assocs., Inc., 96 
F. Supp. 3d 403, 416–22, 427–28 (D.N.J. 2015).1   
 The case proceeded to trial on the question of Miley’s 
personal liability under the TCPA. The evidence on that point 
was mixed. On direct examination, Clemmer testified that 
Miley first suggested fax advertising through Business 
Solutions and instructed her to contact the company to inquire 
about its services. Clemmer said she contacted Business 
Solutions on Miley’s behalf, reported back to him, and needed 
his approval to engage such advertising services. She also 
testified that Miley reviewed proposed advertisements, 
authorized payment for the same, and generally acted as the 
“ultimate decision-maker” in approving the content, quantity, 
timing, and targeting of the transmissions. App. 361. On cross-
examination, however, Clemmer admitted that she had no 
actual recollection of the fax campaigns or Miley’s 
involvement in them and that her testimony was based on 
“[t]he way things worked.” App. 444. She also stated that she 
was the only David Randall employee who communicated 
directly with Business Solutions, and that Miley, in the 
ordinary course, would not have seen or reviewed all of 
Clemmer’s outgoing fax communications.  
 The jury also heard Miley’s response to an 
interrogatory, Miley’s pretrial stipulations, and Miley’s own 
testimony. In his interrogatory response, Miley conceded that 
David Randall was “aware that . . . Miley participated in 
                                                                
1 David Randall filed a third-party complaint and 
obtained a default judgment for $22,405,000 against Caroline 
and Joel Abraham, d/b/a Business to Business Solutions. City 
Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. David/Randall Assocs., Inc., 2015 
WL 4507995, at *4–5 (D.N.J. July 23, 2015).  
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decisions to send some facsimile transmissions.” App. 644. 
Moreover, the jury was told that Miley stipulated that: 
(1) Miley was in charge of David Randall’s marketing and 
advertising; (2) Miley instructed Clemmer to investigate 
Business Solutions’s fax services; (3) Clemmer contacted 
Business Solutions on the company’s and Miley’s behalf and 
relayed the information she received to Miley; and (4) with 
Miley’s help, Clemmer sent information to Business Solutions 
about the fax advertisements David Randall wished to send. 
Miley testified in person, however, that he did not: create the 
advertisement Business Solutions sent; discuss anything 
related to the campaigns with Clemmer; review any 
communications to or from Clemmer relating to the fax blitzes; 
communicate with Business Solutions; or authorize any of the 
conduct at issue in the case. Indeed, he stated that although he 
generally signed checks on behalf of David Randall, he “had 
no involvement in this at all, none,” App. 618; see also App 
624 (“I’ve had no involvement, meaningful or not.”).   
2 
 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the District 
Court produced a set of draft jury instructions. As originally 
proposed, draft Instruction 17 required the jury to find that 
Miley had a “high level” of personal involvement to hold him 
liable. App. 651. City Select objected to that language during 
the charge conference. It then consented to the District Court’s 
suggestion to change “high” to “significant” and to include a 
reference to Instruction 18 after the term “significant.” App. 
652–53. 
 City Select also objected to draft Instruction 18, which 
stated that to hold a corporate officer liable under the TCPA, 
“[t]he officer must have knowledge that he is directly 
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participating in or authorizing the conduct in question.” App. 
654. City Select asserted that there was no authority for such a 
knowledge requirement. The District Court disagreed, 
explaining that “[t]he reason I believe the individual liability 
of a corporate officer requires that the person have knowledge, 
that what they’re doing is authorizing fax advertising, is 
because of the enormous liability . . . that can trigger for the 
person.” App. 655.  
 The District Court then gave the jury the following 
instruction (Instruction 17) as to TCPA liability: 
 As I instructed you at the beginning of this 
trial, a TCPA claim for sending an unsolicited 
fax generally requires proof that: (1) the 
defendant utilized or caused to be utilized a 
telephone facsimile machine to send one or more 
faxes; (2) that the transmissions constituted 
advertisements; (3) that the defendant sent the 
transmissions without the recipient’s consent and 
outside of any one of the statutory exemptions; 
(4) that the defendant qualifies as a “sender” for 
purposes of the TCPA, that is, the entity on 
whose behalf an unsolicited facsimile 
advertisement is sent or whose goods or services 
are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited 
advertisement, or a person acting on behalf of 
that entity; and, in the case of an individual, 
(5) that the individual defendant had a significant 
level of personal involvement in the unlawful fax 
transmissions, as explained below. 
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App. 307. The Court described the requirements for personal 
liability (Instruction 18) as follows: 
 As a general matter, if a corporation is 
found to have violated a federal statute, its 
officers will not be personally liable solely 
because of their status as officers. Under the 
TCPA, however, an individual acting on behalf 
of a corporation may, under certain limited 
circumstances, be held personally or individually 
liable for the corporation’s violations of the 
TCPA if the individual: (1) had direct, personal 
participation in the conduct found to have 
violated the TCPA, or (2) personally authorized 
the conduct found to have violated the TCPA. 
This requirement is phrased in the alternative; it 
is sufficient if Plaintiff proves either that Mr. 
Miley had direct, personal participation in the 
conduct found to have violated the TCPA, or that 
Mr. Miley personally authorized the conduct 
found to have violated the TCPA. 
 Thus, the personal liability of a corporate 
director or officer must be founded upon his 
active oversight of, or control over, the conduct 
that violated the TCPA, rather than merely 
tangential involvement. Involvement is 
“tangential” if it is routine, passive or ministerial. 
 The officer must have knowledge that he 
is directly participating in or authorizing the fax 
advertising, but he need not know that the 
conduct violates the TCPA. Whether the 
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corporate officer knows that the conduct violates 
the TCPA is not relevant to your consideration. 
App. 309–10. The jury also was given a verdict sheet that asked 
them, in Question 1, to decide whether Miley “ha[d] direct, 
personal participation in the . . . unsolicited fax campaign[s].” 
App. 320–21. 
 During its deliberation, the jury requested  
clarification for the degree of personal 
participation for question #1, for the first 
unsolicited fax campaign. Our instructions 
indicate we have to determine if Miley had a 
“significant level” of personal involvement in 
the unlawful fax transmissions, or active oversite 
[sic], not routine or passive. This is not the 
wording of question #1, where it only states 
personal participation. Thank you. 
App. 318. After considering the parties’ positions, the Court 
told the jury that 
The requirement of a “significant level of 
personal involvement in the unlawful fax 
transmissions” applies to determining both 
whether he (1) had direct, personal participation 
in the conduct found to have violated the TCPA, 
or (2) personally authorized the conduct found to 
have violated the TCPA. 
As explained in Instruction No. 18, such 
significant level of personal involvement 
requires the officer’s active oversight of, or 
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control over, the conduct that violated the TCPA, 
rather than merely tangential, routine, passive or 
ministerial involvement. He must, at a minimum, 
have knowledge that he is directly participating 
in or authorizing the fax advertising, or his 
involvement will not be significant. 
Thus, for example, if you find, in considering 
Question 1, that Mr. Miley had direct, personal 
participation at a level of involvement that was 
“significant,” then your answer will be Yes. 
Otherwise, your answer will be No. 
App. 319. The jury answered “No,” absolving Miley of 
personal liability.  
 City Select moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the 
District Court erred in instructing the jury and in responding to 
the jury’s question. The Court denied the motion. City Select 
Auto Sales, Inc. v. David Randall Assocs., Inc., 2017 WL 
1170828, at *4–10 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2017). As to Instruction 
17, it reasoned that “[t]he use of the word ‘significant’ was 
appropriate explanatory commentary,” id. at *6, and it used 
that word “to clarify that the Defendant could not merely be 
tangentially involved in the operation,” id. at *7. The Court 
also noted that had the jury believed Clemmer’s testimony, it 
“easily could have found that Mr. Miley was ‘significantly’ 
involved.” Id. The Court also declined to reconsider its 
inclusion of the knowledge requirement in Instruction 18, 
reasoning that “[i]t is unclear how one could have direct and 
personal participation in a campaign if one did not have any 
knowledge of his or her actions,” and again that if the jury had 
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believed Clemmer’s testimony, it would not have had a 
problem finding the required level of knowledge. Id. at *10.  
II2 
A 
 City Select appeals the District Court’s instructions as 
to personal liability under the TCPA. As an initial matter, we 
note that there is a real question as to whether Miley can be 
held liable under the statute at all.  
 We start with the text of the TCPA and its implementing 
regulations. The TCPA declares it “unlawful for any person 
within the United States . . . to use any telephone facsimile 
machine . . . or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile 
machine, an unsolicited advertisement.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The statute delegates to the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to 
“prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of . . . 
subsection [227(b)].” Id. § 227(b)(2). And pursuant to that 
authority (which includes the power to make rules enforceable 
through the TCPA’s express private right of action, Id. 
§ 227(b)(3)(A)), the agency has clarified that the sender 
subject to liability under the statute is the person “on whose 
behalf [the faxes] are transmitted,” In re Rules and Regulations 
                                                                
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 
376, 386–87 (2012). Our jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
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Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 
10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 12407 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Order].3  
 City Select’s argument that Miley is a “sender” relies on 
language from the 1995 Order stating that liability falls on the 
“author or originator” of the faxes, and from the Eleventh 
Circuit’s statement in Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. 
John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2015), 
that the “on whose behalf” standard is meant to place liability 
“at the source of the offending behavior.” City Select Supp. Br. 
1–2 (quoting 1995 Order, 10 FCC Rcd. at 12407; Palm Beach 
Golf Ctr., 781 F.3d at 1257). Miley is a sender, City Select 
asserts, “because [he] was the ‘author or originator’” of the 
relevant faxes. Id. at 2. 
 City Select’s argument is questionable. To the extent 
Miley planned and executed a fax campaign, he did so in his 
corporate capacity rather than his personal one. “[I]ndividuals 
ordinarily are shielded from personal liability when they do 
business in a corporate form, and . . . it should not lightly be 
inferred that Congress intended to disregard this shield.” 
Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 
1313 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. 
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 677 (1st Cir. 1998)) (discussing direct 
liability of corporate officers under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act). The question is not whether Miley was an “author” of 
unsolicited faxes in the colloquial sense, but whether Congress 
and the FCC intended that we look behind the corporate form 
and impose personal liability on officers who act on the 
corporation’s behalf rather than their own. 
                                                                
3 City Select relies on this interpretation, and neither 
party questions whether we should defer to it.  
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 We question whether Congress intended as much in 
cases like this one. Only one court of appeals has explored the 
“on whose behalf” standard in a precedential opinion. In Siding 
and Insulation Co. v. Alco Vending, Inc., 822 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 
2016), the Sixth Circuit confronted another case in which a 
company had hired Business Solutions to conduct fax 
advertising. Synthesizing existing authority on the point, the 
court explained that “on whose behalf” should not be 
interpreted “with a layperson’s understanding of what that 
phrase might mean.” Id. at 899. Rather, it is a “term of art that 
should be interpreted in a way that seeks to hold liable the 
[actor] ultimately at fault in causing a TCPA violation.” Id. 
 Alco Vending involved determining which of two 
companies—Business Solutions or the defendant—would be 
held liable for a violation, not allocating liability between a 
corporation and its own officer as this case does. So, in addition 
to addressing the concerns raised by the Sixth Circuit in Alco 
Vending, courts facing situations like ours will have to give 
some weight to federal law’s general presumption of respect 
for the corporate form. 
 One possibility is that courts will account for that 
presumption by considering whether the relationship between 
the corporation and the individual defendant was “eccentric 
under accepted norms” of corporate conduct such that faxes 
were really sent on behalf of the individual instead of the entity. 
Cf. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 72 (1998) (holding 
that notwithstanding the presumption that parent corporations 
are not liable for the acts of their subsidiaries, a parent may be 
directly liable under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act as an “operator” of 
a subsidiary’s facility when its “actions . . . are eccentric under 
accepted norms of parental oversight”). We think the result of 
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this case under that test would be straightforward: Miley was 
not in privity with Business Solutions, only David Randall was. 
The faxes advertised David Randall’s services, not Miley’s. 
The company—not Miley—paid Business Solutions. And 
most importantly, there is no allegation, much less any 
evidence, that Miley disregarded or violated corporate norms 
with respect to David Randall. Under these circumstances, the 
faxes were sent on behalf of David Randall, so it is hard to see 
how Miley could be deemed a “sender” under the TCPA. 
 The question of whether Miley was a “sender,” 
however, was never presented to the District Court, and it was 
raised here only on our order requesting supplemental briefing. 
Prior to our mention of the issue, the parties and the District 
Court relied on the longstanding consensus among district 
courts that the contours of corporate officer liability under the 
TCPA are defined by federal common law rather than by the 
text of the statute. On that view, an officer is personally liable 
for an illegal fax if he “had direct, personal participation in or 
personally authorized the conduct found to have violated the 
statute.” Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898 
(W.D. Tex. 2001). As initially briefed, this appeal was about 
whether the District Court properly instructed the jury on that 
theory. 
 We doubt as well, however, whether such common-law 
personal-participation liability is available against corporate 
officers under the TCPA. To be sure, the idea that Congress 
may establish statutory liability without expressly providing 
for it is not without precedent. Courts generally assume that 
“when Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a 
legal background of ordinary tort-related . . . liability rules and 
consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.” 
Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (discussing 
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vicarious liability). But the United States Code abounds with 
examples of Congress expressly authorizing personal-
participation liability or something quite like it. For example, 
corporate antitrust violations are “deemed to be also that of the 
individual directors, officers, or agents . . . who shall have 
authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in 
whole or in part such violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 24. Because 
Congress has demonstrated in many statutes that it “kn[ows] 
how to impose” personal-participation liability “when it 
cho[oses] to do so,” the argument that Congressional silence 
indicates an intent to do so here is a weak one at best. Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 176–77 (1994). 
 Moreover, to the extent that some of our cases appear to 
hold that traditional forms of common-law personal liability 
remain available under federal statutes by default, that 
assumption may no longer be valid. More than 20 years ago, 
the Supreme Court held in Central Bank of Denver that where 
“the text of the 1934 Act [did] not itself reach those who aid 
and abet a § 10(b) violation,” “that conclusion resolve[d] the 
case” because “[i]t is inconsistent with settled methodology in 
§ 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct 
prohibited by the statutory text.” Id. at 176–77. 
 Central Bank of Denver addressed aiding-and-abetting 
liability rather than personal-participation liability, but we see 
little reason why its reasoning would not apply with equal force 
here. Under the circumstances just described, the fact that 
personal-participation liability was available against corporate 
officers at common law (emphasized by our colleague’s 
concurring opinion) would not seem dispositive. As the Court 
made clear in Central Bank of Denver, it would have reached 
the same result “[e]ven assuming . . . a deeply rooted 
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background of aiding and abetting tort liability.” Id. at 184. Put 
simply, in the wake of Central Bank of Denver, “statutory 
silence” as to the continuing availability of common-law 
liability arguably “means there is none.” Boim v. Holy Land 
Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc) (Posner, J.).  
 We may, of course, affirm for any basis supported by 
the law and the record. See, e.g., Migliaro v. Fidelity Nat’l 
Indemnity Ins. Co., 880 F.3d 660, 664 n.6 (3d Cir. 2018). And 
carried to their logical ends, our doubts as to the existence of 
either a statutory or common-law basis for Miley’s liability 
would permit us to affirm the judgment of the District Court on 
the ground that Miley cannot be held liable under the TCPA at 
all. Yet we are reluctant to decide such an important question 
when it was neither litigated in the District Court nor fully 
briefed and argued on appeal. Accordingly, we will assume 
without deciding that Miley may be held liable for David 
Randall’s TCPA violations under a personal-participation 
theory. For the reasons that follow, however, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court because we perceive no 
reversible error in the jury instructions.   
B 
 We exercise plenary review of a district court’s jury 
instruction to determine whether the instruction misstated the 
applicable law. Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 
269 (3d Cir. 2017). City Select argues that the Court erred in 
instructing the jury that it needed to find that Miley’s 
involvement was “significant,” that he exercised “active 
oversight,” and that he had “knowledge that he [was] directly 
participating in or authorizing the fax advertising.” City Select 
Br. 25–26. We disagree. 
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 Assuming that personal-participation liability is in fact 
available under the TCPA, a corporation’s officer “may be 
personally liable under the [statute] if he had direct, personal 
participation in or personally authorized the conduct found to 
have violated the statute, and was not merely tangentially 
involved.” Am. Blastfax, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 898; see also, e.g., 
Ott v. Mortg. Inv’rs Corp. of Ohio, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 
1060 (D. Or. 2014); Balt.-Wash. Tel. Co. v. Hot Leads Co., 584 
F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (D. Md. 2008). In other words, a 
corporate officer can be personally liable if he “actually 
committed the conduct that violated the TCPA, and/or [he] 
actively oversaw and directed this conduct.” Am. Blastfax, 164 
F. Supp. 2d at 897.4  
 The District Court’s instructions did not misstate the 
applicable law. First, Instruction 17’s use of the words 
“significant level,” App. 307, plainly referred to Instruction 
18’s provisions that Miley could be liable if he “(1) had direct, 
personal participation in the conduct found to have violated the 
TCPA, or (2) personally authorized the conduct found to have 
violated the TCPA,” and its additional statement that liability 
for an officer “must be founded upon his active oversight of, 
or control over, the conduct that violated the TCPA, rather than 
merely tangential involvement,” App. 309. Those 
requirements were simply concrete descriptions of what 
                                                                
4 Some courts have required more, holding that “[s]ome 
showing of intentional misconduct or gross failure to 
implement policies that comply [with the TCPA] should be 
required.” Appelbaum v. Rickenbacker Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 
12121104, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2013) (quoting Mais v. Gulf 
Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 2013 WL 1283885, at *4 n.1 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013)). 
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constitutes a “significant” level of involvement, and the word 
“significant” did not impose a higher burden of proof.  
 Second, the District Court appropriately answered the 
jury’s question about the word “significant” because, in its 
response, the Court tied that word to the requirement that the 
officer exercised “active oversight of, or control over, the 
conduct that violated the TCPA, rather than merely tangential, 
routine, passive or ministerial involvement.” App. 319. Third, 
that other courts have not used the word “significant” does not 
mean that the District Court’s instructions were contrary to 
those decisions. Indeed, the use of the word “significant” is 
consistent with cases that have held that corporate officers can 
be personally liable when they “actively oversaw and directed 
th[e] conduct.” Am. Blastfax, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 897. Fourth, 
the District Court did not erroneously add an element of proof 
regarding a defendant’s state of mind. Requiring a finding that 
the defendant-officer had “knowledge that he [was] directly 
participating in or authorizing the fax advertising,” App. 309, 
was simply part of proving direct participation. An officer 
could not have directly and personally participated in a fax 
advertising campaign without having knowledge of his actions. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in instructing the 
jury.5  
                                                                
5 Even assuming the District Court erred in instructing 
the jury, any error was harmless because it is “highly probable 
that the error did not contribute to the judgment.” Egan, 851 
F.3d at 276 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As 
the District Court noted, Clemmer’s and Miley’s testimonies 
differed in significant ways. In finding in favor of Miley, the 
jury necessarily rejected Clemmer’s testimony. 
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C 
 City Select also contends that the District Court erred in 
denying its motion for a new trial. A court may grant a new 
trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been 
granted in an action at law in federal court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
59(a)(1)(A), but “it should do so only when the great weight of 
the evidence cuts against the verdict and . . . a miscarriage of 
justice would result if the verdict were to stand,” Leonard v. 
Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 386 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). We 
review an order denying a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59 for abuse of discretion. Id. Because the District Court 
did not err in instructing the jury, it did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to grant a new trial based on those instructions.  
III 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment and order. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I agree with my colleagues that the District Court’s jury 
instructions were not erroneous and its judgment should be 
affirmed.  However, the majority questions—in dicta—
whether a corporate officer may be held personally liable under 
the TCPA.  I write separately because a corporate officer 
indeed may be held personally liable under the TCPA for 
sending unsolicited fax advertisements for the officer’s 
corporation. 
 
I 
 
 Like the majority, I start with the statute’s text.  The 
TCPA makes it “unlawful for any person within the United 
States . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine . . . to 
send[ ] to a telephone facsimile machine[ ] an unsolicited 
advertisement[.]”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).  Any “person” 
includes individuals and corporations.  1 U.S.C. § 1.  The 
statute is silent, however, “as to who should be classified as a 
sender of unsolicited fax advertisements.”  Palm Beach Golf 
Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 
1245, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).  Faced with this silence, the FCC 
addressed the question of whether fax broadcasters can be 
liable under the TCPA for sending unwanted faxes on behalf 
of another.  The FCC stated that “the entity or entities on whose 
behalf facsimiles are transmitted are ultimately liable for 
compliance with the rule banning unsolicited facsimile 
advertisements, and that fax broadcasters are not liable for 
compliance with this rule.”  Rules and Regulations 
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991, 10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 12407 (1995).  That interpretation, 
however, does not address whether individuals such as 
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corporate officers who authorized a broadcaster to send fax 
advertisements may be held liable.   
 
 Given the statute’s and FCC’s silence on this particular 
question, we look to the legislative backdrop to the TCPA.  The 
TCPA codifies common law torts such as invasion of privacy, 
nuisance, and trespass to chattels.  See Mims v. Arrow Fin. 
Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012) (stating that Congress 
enacted the TCPA to, among other things, curtail “intrusive 
invasion[s] of privacy” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc., 729 F.3d 370, 
376-77 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the TCPA is meant to 
protect privacy); Bell v. Survey Sampling Int’l, LLC, No. 3:15-
CV-1666 (MPS), 2017 WL 1013294, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 
2017) (explaining that the TCPA embodies the common-law 
tort of invasion of privacy); Klein v. Hyundai Capital Am., No. 
8:16-cv-01469-JLS-JCGx, 2016 WL 10519281, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 6, 2016) (stating that “‘[t]he TCPA codifies one 
application of the long-recognized common law tort of 
invasion of privacy’ as well as ‘the tort of nuisance.’” 
(alterations omitted) (quoting LaVigne v. First Cmty. 
Bancshares, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00934-WJ-LF, 2016 WL 
6305992, at *7 (D.N.M. Oct. 19, 2016)); Mey v. Got Warranty, 
Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 645, 647 (N.D.W. Va. 2016) (stating 
that “the TCPA can be seen as merely liberalizing and 
codifying the application of th[e] common law tort [of 
intrusion-upon-seclusion as invasion of privacy] to a 
particularly intrusive type of unwanted telephone call” and that 
unwanted calls bear “a close relationship” to the “ancient 
common law tort” of trespass to chattels).  “[W]hen Congress 
creates a tort action, it legislates against a legal background of 
ordinary tort-related . . . liability rules and consequently 
intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”  Meyer v. 
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Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003).  A statute’s silence as to 
those background rules “cannot show that [Congress] intended 
to apply an unusual modification of those rules.”  Id. at 286.  
Thus, we consider the TCPA’s language in light of common-
law tort principles.   
 
 The most relevant tort principle here is that corporate 
officers can be personally liable for their own torts.  
Specifically, “[a] corporate officer is individually liable for the 
torts he personally commits and cannot shield himself behind 
a corporation when he is an actual participant in the tort.”  
Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 
1978); see also, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 275 (3d 
Cir. 1967) (“The general, if not universal, rule is that an officer 
of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by 
the corporation is personally liable therefor; but that an officer 
of a corporation who takes no part in the commission of the tort 
committed by the corporation is not personally liable to third 
persons for such a tort . . . unless he specifically directed the 
particular act to be done, or participated, or cooperated 
therein.” (quoting 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Corporations § 1137 (perm. ed. rev. 1965)); Hitchcock v. Am. 
Plate Glass Co., 259 F. 948, 953 (3d Cir. 1919) (holding that 
an officer of a corporation is a joint tortfeasor, along with the 
corporation, as to torts “which he actually brings about” and 
“in which he actually participates”).  Applying this common-
law rule to TCPA claims is consistent with the FCC’s 
interpretation of “sender” because, as long as the officer is 
sufficiently involved in the illegal fax transmissions, liability 
lies with him or her as a “person” who is the source of the 
wrongful conduct.  See Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, 781 
F.3d at 1257 (“By construing the sender as the party ‘on whose 
behalf facsimiles are transmitted,’ the FCC has placed liability 
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at the source of the offending behavior that Congress intended 
to curtail.” (citation omitted)).  Moreover, other statutes that 
use the term “any person” also have been interpreted to apply 
to corporate officers.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Universal 
Elections, 787 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416 (D. Md. 2011) (noting 
several statutes that impose liability on “any person,” including 
corporate officers in their personal capacity).  Thus, corporate 
officers who personally engage in or authorize actions that 
violate the TCPA may be held liable for those violations. 
 
 Miley argues that he cannot be liable under the 
personal-participation theory because it is equivalent to an 
aiding-and-abetting claim.  His argument fails.  Aiding-and-
abetting liability “create[s] secondary liability in persons other 
than the violator of the statute,” id. at 184 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), and thereby extends liability to those 
who aid the violator, id. at 176.  Personal-participation liability 
differs from aiding-and-abetting liability.  The former 
penalizes a tortfeasor for conduct that violates or causes the 
violation of the statute, while the latter penalizes conduct that 
does not itself violate the statute.  See Balt.-Wash. Tel. Co. v. 
Hot Leads Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745-46 (D. Md. 2008) 
(rejecting a claim for aiding-and-abetting a TCPA violation but 
stating that individual corporate defendants can be liable under 
the TCPA because of their involvement in sending unsolicited 
faxes or causing such faxes to be sent); cf. Elec. Lab. Supply 
Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 803-08 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability under the Lanham 
Act’s ex parte seizure provision because the provision 
specifically governs the “applicant” whose trademark was 
violated, and the term “applicant” is narrower than the term 
“any person” under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides 
a basis for personal liability of corporate officers).  The fact 
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that a statute does not explicitly provide for aiding-and-
abetting liability does not mean that it forecloses personal 
liability for violations of the statute.   
 
 Accordingly, notwithstanding the TCPA’s silence as to 
personal liability for corporate officers and the FCC’s 
interpretation concerning whether a fax broadcaster can be 
liable, a corporate officer can face personal liability under the 
TCPA for actions he personally authorized or took.  The 
District Court’s instructions properly informed the jury of this 
basis for liability.   
 
II 
 
 For these reasons, I concur.   
